Under the Basel II Accord, banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) have to communicate their daily risk estimates to the monetary authorities at the beginning of the trading day, using a variety of Value-at-Risk (VaR) models to measure risk. Sometimes the risk estimates communicated using these models are too high, thereby leading to large capital requirements and high capital costs.
Introduction
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) concept has become a standard tool in the exploding area of risk measurement and management. In brief, VaR is defined as an estimate of the probability and size of the potential loss to be expected over a given period.
This concept has become especially important following the 1995 amendment to the Basel Accord, whereby banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) were permitted to use internal models to calculate their VaR thresholds (see Jorion (2000) for a detailed discussion of VaR). Consequently, the last few years have witnessed a growing literature comparing modelling approaches and implementation procedures to answer the question of how to measure VaR, with many research studies arguing in favour or against various VaR models.
The amendment to the Basel Accord was designed to reward institutions with superior risk management systems. A back-testing procedure, whereby the realized returns are compared with the VaR forecasts, was introduced to assess the quality of the internal models. In cases where internal models lead to a greater number of violations than could reasonably be expected, given the confidence level, the ADI is required to hold a higher level of capital (see Table 1 in the Appendix for the penalties imposed under the Basel II Accord). If an ADI"s VaR forecasts are violated more than 10 times in any financial year, the ADI may be required to adopt the "Standardized" approach. The imposition of such a penalty is severe as it affects the profitability of the ADI directly through higher capital charges, has a damaging effect on the ADI"s reputation, and may lead to the imposition of a more stringent external model to forecast the ADI"s VaR thresholds. That is why financial managers tend to prefer following strategies that are passive and conservative.
Excessive conservatism has a negative impact on the profitability of ADIs as higher capital charges are subsequently required. Academics and practitioners should ask the question if there is room to minimise the capital charges not only using different models to forecast VaR but also through a communication strategy
given the Basel II Accord. ADIs are not allowed to violate more than 10 times in any financial year, but any number less than 10 is permitted. Therefore, the 4 decision maker should seek a strategy that allows an endogenous decision as to how many times ADIs should violate in any financial year.
In this paper we formulate the profit maximizing problem of an ADI subject to capital requirements under the Basel II Accord. It is suggested that ADI"s may choose an optimal reporting policy that can strategically under-report or overreport their VaR forecasts in order to minimize daily capital charges. Accordingly, we characterize a strategic market risk disclosure policy meant to reduce daily capital charges and to manage the number of violations. We suggest that the decision maker should take some actions in each state based on the trade-off between expected capital requirements and the expected number of violations.
Financial managers could adopt a different strategy in favourable situations (a small number of violations) than in unfavourable situations (a large number of violations). The amount of expected risk that the manager should report to the monetary authority (namely, a fraction of the VaR estimated using a given procedure) should increase with the number of violations.
In a favourable situation, the decision maker could take more risk (perhaps reporting an expected risk lower than the one suggested by the model used to forecast volatility). In cases of a small number of violations, communication of a low amount of risk allows profiting from the lower capital requirement, subject to having an acceptable trade-off with the upside-risk of increasing the number of violations. If the capital requirement is lower, more funds can be invested in assets at the cost of a marginal increase in the probability of violation. In a situation of a high number of violations, the decision maker must take less risk, and reporting high expected risk (even higher than the forecast) is needed to decrease the probability of violations.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the problem faced by ADI"s subject to the Basel II Accord Amendment. Section 3 reviews some of the most frequently used univariate VaR forecasting models. In Section 4
we present the new market risk disclosure strategy. Section 5 gives some experimental results, and Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions. 
Given the volume of assets and deposits, an increase in E reduces expected profits, so the ADI is interested in using the lowest possible equity.
At any given time, ADI"s are required to satisfy capital requirement (CRq t ) according to the associated risks. Specifically, this means:
The Basel II Accord stipulates that daily CRq t for market risk must be set at the higher of the previous day"s VaR and the average VaR over the previous 60 business days, multiplied by a factor m = [3+k], where k is a penalty in the form of a higher multiplicative factor when there are more than 4 violations in the preceding financial year. 
k is to be set within a range of 0 to 1 (see (4) below) depending on the supervisor"s assessment of the ADI"s risk management practices and on the results of a simple back test (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)). The multiplication factor is determined by the number of times losses exceed the day"s VaR figure (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)). The minimum multiplication factor of 3 is in place to compensate for a number of errors that arise in model implementation: simplifying assumptions, analytical approximations, small sample biases and numerical errors will tend to reduce the true risk coverage of the model (Stahl (1997) 
Where nov is the number of violations during the previous financial year. 1 
Subject to (2), (3), (4) and (7) A necessary condition to maximize 錯誤! 找不到參照來源。 in a given period of (say) 250 days, is to minimize the total CRq t for the period. The standard approach in the literature is to report in (3) the estimate of VaR obtained from a given model (see, for example, Sarma et al. (2003) ). In this paper, we incorporate the additional flexibility of modifying the forecast of VaR from a given model.
The leading econometric models for forecasting VaR are modified to accommodate alternative risk strategies. We propose a simple and intuitive rule for modifying the values of the forecasts from the models. The rule becomes more conservative as the number of violations increases, and more aggressive in periods of few or no violations, by incorporating penalties and rewards that are based on performance. The new approach contains the standard rule as a special case.
Models for Forecasting VaR
As discussed previously, ADIs can use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds. There are alternative time series models for the conditional volatility,
In what follows, we present several conditional volatility models to evaluate our strategic market risk disclosure, namely GARCH, GJR and EGARCH, with both normal and t distribution errors. For an extensive discussion of the theoretical properties of several of these models, see Ling and McAleer (2002a , 2002b , 2003a .
As an alternative to estimating the parameters, we use the exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) method by Riskmetrics TM (1996) that calibrates the unknown parameters. The models are presented in increasing order of complexity.
GARCH
For a wide range of financial data series, time-varying conditional variances can be explained empirically through the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model, which was proposed by Engle (1982) . When the time-varying conditional variance has both autoregressive and moving average components, this leads to the generalized ARCH(p,q), or GARCH(p,q), model of Bollerslev (1986) .
It is very common to impose the widely estimated GARCH(1,1) specification in advance.
Consider the stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model for daily returns, t y :
, where the shocks to returns are given by:
,~(0,1) 
GJR
In the symmetric GARCH model, the effects of positive shocks (or upward movements in daily returns) on the conditional variance, t h , are assumed to be the same as the negative shocks (or downward movements in daily returns). In order to accommodate asymmetric behaviour, Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1992) proposed a model (hereafter GJR), for which GJR(1,1) is defined as follows:
, 
EGARCH
An alternative model to capture asymmetric behaviour in the conditional variance is the Exponential GARCH, EGARCH(1,1), model of Nelson (1991) , namely:
where the parameters  ,  and  have different interpretations from those in the GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1, 1) models.
As noted in McAleer et al. (2007) , there are some important differences between EGARCH and the previous two models, as follows: (i) EGARCH is a model of the logarithm of the conditional variance, which implies that no restrictions on the parameters are required to ensure 0  t h ; (ii) moment conditions are required for the GARCH and GJR models as they are dependent on lagged unconditional shocks, whereas EGARCH does not require moment conditions to be established as it depends on lagged conditional shocks (or standardized residuals); 11 EGARCH captures asymmetries differently from GJR. The parameters  and  in EGARCH(1,1) represent the magnitude (or size) and sign effects of the standardized residuals, respectively, on the conditional variance, whereas  and    represent the effects of positive and negative shocks, respectively, on the conditional variance in GJR(1,1).
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
The three conditional volatility models given above are estimated under the following distributional assumptions on the conditional shocks: (1) normal, and (2) t. As an alternative to estimating the parameters of the appropriate conditional volatility models, Riskmetrics TM (1996) 
where  is a decay parameter. Riskmetrics ™ (1996) suggests that  should be set at 0.94 for purposes of analysing daily data. As no parameters are estimated, there is no need to establish any moment or log-moment conditions for purposes of demonstrating the statistical properties of the estimators.
A Dynamic Decision Rule for Strategic Market Risk Disclosure
Recent empirical studies (see, for example, Berkowitz and O'Brien (2001) and Gizycki and Hereford (1998) As we saw in section 2, a necessary condition to maximize profits is to minimize daily capital charges while the number of violations remains below 10.
Accordingly, in this section, as a solution to the general ADI"s profit maximization problem, we propose to calculate forecasts of VaR based on the models described in the previous section and reporting a modified value of it, called Market Risk Disclosure (MRD) Policy, as follows:
Report MRD P VaR (15) where P t varies with the number of violations to communicate risk to the monetary authority. The variable P t is a measure of how conservative or aggressive the MRD is in comparison with the estimated risk: P t < 1 corresponds to an aggressive strategy because the MRD is below the estimated risk, whereas P t >1 represents a conservative approach. Notice that when P t = 1, the standard reporting strategy is a special case of the new strategy for forecasting and communication.
Dynamic Learning Strategy (DYLES)
In (15) 
The dynamic learning function, P t , consists of three additive terms:
(1) 0 P is an initial condition and, as time passes, has a decreasing effect on DYLES.
(2)  P is the penalty for each violation: any additional violation should be penalized, thereby increasing the market risk disclosure and making our strategy more conservative. 
In the above formulation, the solutions to (18) belong to the parametric class implied by (16). This is a simplification of the more general problem given in 錯誤! 找不到參照來源。 and (15) The parameters of the penalty function would need to be calibrated for a given asset and for each model to calculate VaR. In the next section, we provide some insights as to how well this function works for a given portfolio and for different models of the conditional variance.
Experimental Results
When we have proposed a new MRD policy based on a dynamic learning penalty function, we are interested in assessing how well it performs in terms of daily capital costs and the number of violations compared with the alternative strategy (that is, no strategy) of not responding to either violations or the absence of violations.
Owing to the dearth of theoretical results in this area, we examine the behaviour of our penalty function using calibration. As the basis for comparison we use The calibration procedure is as follows :
1. We assume the models described in Section 3 to be the internal ADI"s models that are used to forecast the 1-day ahead conditional variances and VaR thresholds.
2. For all possible parameter combinations of  , we calculate P t , as given in (17). 3. Given the VaR calculated in step 1 and P t in step 2, calculate the market risk disclosure using (11).
4. The number of violations (NoV) and the average capital requirements (AvCRq) for the whole period are reported.
5. Finally, we compare NoV and the AvCRq requirements with the no strategy policy.
Data and volatility measures
The data used for the calibration of DYLES are the closing daily prices for The returns at time t () t R are defined as:
where t
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[Insert Figure 1 around here] Figure 1 shows the Standard and Poor"s returns. The series exhibit clustering, which could be captured by an appropriate time series model. The descriptive statistics for the index returns are given in Table 2 . The mean is close to zero, and the range is between -6% and 5.57%. The Jarque-Bera Lagrange multiplier test for normality rejects the null hypothesis of normally distributed returns. As the series displays a high kurtosis, this would seem to indicate the existence of extreme observations, which is not surprising for financial returns data.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Several measures of volatility are available in the literature. In order to gain some intuition, we adopt the measure proposed in Franses and van Dijk (1999) , where the true volatility of returns is defined as: Table 3 around here]
Results

19
In Table 3 we see the differences between using DYLES or a passive strategy for the S&P and several VaR models. After calibration, we have chosen the set of parameters P 0 = 1.2, θ P = 0.12, θ R = 0.3, which is the combination which seems to be most widely optimal across the various models.
20 We observe in the last column that the capital requirement decreases in all cases between 0.4% (3 basis points) and 14.01% (96 basis points) when using DYLES, except when the GARCH-t model is used. Moreover, the number of violations decreases when they were above 10 and increases, within the limits, when there are few violations. The exception in Table 4 in the Appendix shows that the best result for the GARCH-t model and DYLES is for  = [1.0, 0.11, 0.3] with 9 violations and 5.80% as AvCRq, that is, 90 basis points less than the no strategy policy.
We conclude that DYLES always beats the passive strategy when properly calibrated. Due to its context-sensitive behaviour, DYLES tends to concentrate the distribution of the number of violations. In cases where there is conservative behaviour, it tends to increase the number of violations, whereas when the number of violations is large, it tends to reduce it to below the limit of 10.
When properly used, DYLES can decrease the daily capital requirements substantially, up to 96 basis points in the case analyzed above, while restricting the number of violations to within the limits of the Basel II Accord.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
In order to gain some intuition, in Figure 3 Figure 3 . This is attributable exclusively to the penalty function of the dynamic learning function strategy (DYLES). [Insert Figure 4 around here]
Overall, the capital requirements for DYLES are lower than when DYLES is not used by 9.5% (63 basis points). The number of violations also decreases from 12 to 8. This is a general pattern observed across different VaR models to varying degrees, as seen in Table 3 above.
This example suggests that, with proper calibration, the DYLES strategy can help decrease daily capital requirements while restricting the number of violations to within the desired limits. Relying on DYLES, which modulates market risk disclosure, can reduce the effects of these deficiencies, as DYLES concentrates NoV throughout the models tested. In some of the cases discussed above, DYLES can control the number of violations at low cost in terms of the daily capital requirements.
Conclusion
Under the Basel II Accord, ADIs have to communicate their risk estimates to the monetary authorities, and use a variety of VaR models to estimate risks. ADIs are subject to a back-test that compares the daily VaR to the subsequent realized returns, and ADIs that fail the back-test can be subject to the imposition of standard models that can lead to higher daily capital costs. Additionally, the Basel II Accord stipulates that the daily capital charge that the bank must carry as protection against market risk must be set at the higher of the previous day"s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 business days, multiplied by a factor k. An ADI"s objective is to maximize profits, so they wish to minimize their capital charges while restricting the number of violations in a given year below the maximum of 10 allowed by the Basel II Accord.
Alternative VaR models currently in use can lead to high daily capital requirements or an excessive number of violations. In this paper we formulated the profit maximizing problem of an ADI subject to capital requirements under the Basel II Accord as ADI"s are required to choose an optimal reporting strategy that may strategically under-report or over-report their VaR forecasts in order to 29 minimize daily capital charges. We also proposed a new dynamic learning strategy, DYLES, designed to minimize the daily capital requirements, while restricting the number of violations to below the penalty limit. We designed a market risk disclosure strategy driven by the number of violations to communicate the risk to the monetary authority. The strategy is context sensitive, and depends on the history of violations. It is intended to penalize VaR models when a loss exceeds the reported VaR by increasing the risk for the following periods. On the other hand, after a given period with no violations, the criterion offers a reward by decreasing the reported risk.
In order to illustrate the practicability of DYLES, we applied it to the Standard and Poor 500 Index using seven different VaR models. After estimation of the VaR models and calibration of the parameters, we showed that it could lower the daily capital requirements substantially (by up to 14.3%, or 95 basis points, when we compared, for example, the GJR-t model + DYLES to the no strategy Riskmetrics TM policy), while restricting the numbers of violations to within the Basel II Accord limits (9 for GJR-t + DYLES and 12 for the no strategy Riskmetrics TM policy ).
Simplicity would seem to have been the key to the popularity of VaR, particularly as a means of providing information to an ADI"s senior management. DYLES is as simple and intuitive as VaR. When there is a violation, it increases immediately, thereby becoming more conservative and decreasing the risks of further violations, whereas after a period of no violations, it becomes less conservative, thereby allowing lower daily capital requirements.
The preceding arguments suggest that DYLES can be used profitably by ADIs to reduce their average daily capital requirements, while restricting the numbers of violations to the Basel II Accord penalty limits. Table 4 MRD results when NoV < = 10 and CRq < 6.1% EGARCH EGARCH-t NoV AvCRq P 0  P  R NoV AvCRq P 0  Table 6 MRD results when NoV < = 10 and CRq < 6.1% Table 7 MRD results when NoV < = 10 and CRq < 6.1% 
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